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Accountability: The Constitutional Goal*
WILLIAM F. SWINDLER**
The agonizing judicial and political inquiries which accompanied the
Watergate issue from the spring of 1973 through the summer of 1974
were at bottom compelled by an unsettled question of American con-
stitutional theory and practice. This was, and is, the question of how
the executive/administrative branch is to be held acountable to the
sovereign power, an entity which itself was felicitously defined by
Chief Justice Burger as "composed of the three branches" of the gov-
ernment.1
In the constitutional crisis which bred three judicial tests of related
issues,2 the resignation of a Vice President and a President, the suc-
cession of an appointed Vice President and the appointing of a second
under unanticipated uses of the twenty-fifth amendment to the Con-
stitution,3 the question of accountability was perforce removed from
the abstractions of the theory of separation of powers, as well as from
the context of generalized judicial statements enunciated under far
less parlous circumstances.
In a government of separate powers, John Locke had written, "the
good of society requires that several things should be left to the dis-
cretion of him that has the executive power. '" 4 This was necessitated,
* Based in part on a lecture presented at the College of Law, University
of Oklahoma, November 8, 1974.
** John Marshall Professor of Law, College of William and Mary; Visiting
Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma, Fall 1974.
1. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 904 (1974).
2. In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973); Nixon v. Sirica,
487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Application of Senate Select Comm. on Presiden-
tipl Campaign Activities, 361 F. Supp. 1282 (D.D.C. 1973).
3. See the discussion in Part III of this paper infra.
4. J. LocKE, Two TPEATIsFs or CrviL GovmxNmrm 199 (1924).
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Locke concluded, because the legislative branch could not anticipate
every detail of government responsibility to act under every circum-
stance; a "power to act according to discretion for the public good"
was therefore to be found inherent in the executive.5 Locke con-
cluded, however, that this latitude in the executive was susceptible
of being defined and curtailed periodically by the people's representa-
tives "in those points where they found disadvantage from it."6 Thus
the discretionary power was not in fact to be treated as an inalienable
attribute of the executive, but rather as a right left to him by the
people for so long as it efficaciously served their needs.
The Age of Reason which was Locke's intellectual heritage eschewed
concentration of power in a single office. At the same time, however,
James Madison conceded that American experience under the Articles
of Confederation had demonstrated the fatal incapacity in a system
where "the authority of the whole society [is] everywhere subordinate
to the authority of the parts. '7 What the Constitutional Convention
of 1787 sought, according to Madison, was a system of checks and bal-
ances as between three separate departments of government by pro-
viding that "these departments be so far connected and blended as
to give each a constitutional control over the others.",,
Chief Justice John Marshall found that article II of the Constitution
vested in the President "certain important political powers, in the
exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable
only to his country in his political character, and to his own con-
science."9 Yet Marshall in the same opinion spoke of "a government
of laws, and not of men"' 0-a concept which Justice Charles F. Miller
cited 80 years later as unequivocal."
Miller wrote at the beginning of the modern constitutional age, on
the eve of the first major regulatory enactments of Congress in the
Interstate Commerce Commission Act of 188712 and the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act of 1890,13 and the beginning of the flow of legislative au-
thority toward the executive and administrative branches. The ulti-
mate judicial doctrine seeking to cope with this trend, with reference
to the administrative regulatory process, came to be expressed in the
"intelligible standard" by which the legitimacy of agency authority
could be tested.'4 An analogous doctrine with respect to executive
authority has not yet been developed, although the judicial and po-
5. Id. at 199.
6. Id. at 200.
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 306 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison).8. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison).9. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803).
10. Id. at 163.
11. Justice Charles F. Miller stated that "[n]o man in this country is sohigh that he is above the law," and that all officers of government "are crea-
tures of the law and are bound to obey it." United States v. Lee, 106 U.S.
196, 220 (1882).
12. Act of Feb. 4, 18R7. ch. 104. 24 Stat. .79.
13. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209.
14. See, e.g., American Power and Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946);Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940).
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litical struggles generated by Watergate may prove to have been a
period of gestation. With the accelerated movement, particularly
after the New Deal and World War II, toward concentration of power
in the executive, the feasibility of an accountability doctrine as applied
to the Presidency has become increasingly difficult to articulate at
the same time that it has become increasingly obvious as a need.
An age of centripetal economy combined with chronic emergency has
seemed inexorably to require a capacity for flexible initiative in the
presidential office. At the same time, the temptation to exploit this
combination as a means of merging public, political, and personal inter-
ests under color of an unqualified executive privilege was what
Watergate was all about.
The fact is that the authority of the executive branch, only gener-
ally stated in the Constitution itself, developed largely from the neces-
sities of the case, the force of personality in the individual office-
holder, and the periodic desuetude of Congress or the courts. A nar-
row constructionist like Thomas Jefferson could nonetheless stretch
his own authority to the limit (in his view) to justify acquisition of
the Louisiana Territory, while an aggressively independent executive
like Andrew Jackson had no difficulty deciding upon his duty in chal-
lenging an agency created by Congress itself, for example, the Second
Bank of the United States.' 5 Theodore Roosevelt's philosophy of
presidential power was unequivocal: In the face of what "was im-
peratively necessary for the nation," and absent any explicit constitu-
tional bar, "it was not only his right but his duty to do anything that
the needs of the nation required."'16 William Howard Taft, from his
unique dual perspective first as President and later as Chief Justice,
arrived by his own method of reasoning at a substantially similar posi-
tion in finding power in the executive to remove appointees at discre-
tion when he concluded that it was in the national interest.17
Yet the Court under such differing Chief Justices as Charles Evans
Hughes, Fred M. Vinson, and Earl Warren came to conclusions con-
sistently opposed to Taft's. The discretionary power of the executive,
it was held in 1935,18 was circumscribed by the statutory conditions
respecting the subject-matter to which the power was being applied-
a position the Court enlarged upon in 1952.19 In 1958 it further de-
clared that such power "is [not] impliedly conferred ... simply be-
15. See generally D. MALONE, THo-As JEF'soN AND Hs Tinm (1948); M.
JAMFs, THE LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON (1938).
16. T. ROOSEVELT, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 357 (1925). An example of such action
was the coup d'etat leading to the clearing of Central American obstacles to
United States construction of the Panama Canal.
17. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
18. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
19. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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cause Congress said nothing about it. ' '20 The nearest to judicial con-
sensus on non-reviewable presidential discretion has been with refer-
ence to the functions of the Chief Executive in the area of international
affairs.21 In domestic affairs, with their ready commingling with polit-
ical considerations, it has been another matter, as Watergate proved
in an ultimate extreme. Faced with Richard Nixon's definition of
executive privilege as exclusively a matter of executive definition,
Congress discerned, in Locke's phrase, "disadvantage from it," and
took up the challenge.
Accountability: The British Principle
The constitutional furor of 1973-74 inspired much discussion of the
desirability of adopting some features of the British constitutional sys-
tem as a means of overcoming the prospective dilemma of the Nixon-
Congress confrontation, namely, the non-removability of the President
except by impeachment. The practical difficulties are at least two-
fold: Adoption of a procedure which in Great Britain is based upon
constitutional "convention" (that is, generally accepted custom) and
in the case of the written Constitution of the United States requires a
written and ratified amendment; and identifying and selecting from
among the details of British practice those which can efficaciously be
translated into a formal amendment.
"Convention requires that all Ministers must sit in one or other of
the Houses of Parliament, in order that their activities may be subject
to Parliamentary supervision," writes a leading authority on the
British constitution. 22 The supervision, in turn, most commonly takes
the form of the parliamentary question directed to specific ministers
and "[t] he asking of questions is now one of the most important func-
tions of Parliament" 23 as it focuses public attention on matters of in-
terest and serves as a check on executive action.24
Questions are presumably directed to ministers as to "(i) public
affairs with which they are officially connected, (ii) proceedings pend-
ing in Parliament, or (iii) matters of administration for which they
20. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958).
21. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
22. 0. PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 267 (5th ed.
1973).
23. Id. at 170.
24. Professor Phillips states:Questions are asked in order to focus attention on matters of topical
interest either to individual constituents or to the nublic generally.Owing to the publicity given by the Pres. . . the practice is ifdulged
in more for the benefit of the electorate than of the House ....Owing to the strictness of Party discipline in modern times, debates
tend to run on Party lines. Ques ion time therefore constitute; an im-
portant check on the activities of the Executive. It is then that the
private members [i.e., back benchers or nonparty membersi come
into their own, for they can put forward the grievances of individual
citizens who have suffered at the hands of Government Departments
Id. at'170-71.
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are responsible."25 Where accountability results in unfavorable par-
liamentary consensus, the individual may resign; where the collective
responsibility or accountability of the Cabinet results in unfavorable
parliamentary action, in the extreme instance of a vote of no confi-
dence, the entire Government resigns.26 Convention stipulates that
the Prime Minister is to advise the Sovereign to dissolve Parliament
as the means of effectuating this collective submission of the issue
to the voters.27
This recapitulation of the details of British procedure seems desir-
able as a background to the question of whether, and to what degree,
British practice might be adaptable to the American constitutional
process. The fundamental difference, of course, stems from the fact
that separation of powers is a principle of American, and not of
British, constitutional government. 28 In theory and practice, the ex-
ecutive agency has been encouraged to operate on its own initiative in
the American system. British Cabinet officers appear before the Com-
mons because, as a practical matter, they, as well as other ministers
of government, are members of Parliament and therefore subject to
its discipline; American Cabinet officers appear before committees of
Congress as a matter of policy, but in the Nixon administration it was
frequently stressed that executive independence, i.e., privilege, could
either preclude their so appearing or limit their responses to ques-
tioning.
The crux of the matter is the fundamental difference between a
form of government in which Parliament is supreme, and a form based
upon separation of powers. British Cabinets are essentially the agents
of Parliament; in American political practice, the executive and legis-
lative branches are separately responsible to the electorate. The "ad-
ministration" (Government) in Great Britain rests upon a party ma-
jority or a coalition in the House of Commons; in American political
history, particularly of the mid-twentieth century, it has been com-
mon for one or both Houses of Congress to be coritrolled by the party
in opposition to the President. A British Cabinet, at least in theory
and to a large degree in practice, promulgates a program subject to
25. Id. at 169-70. Professor Phillips states:
The responsibility of Ministers ... is both individual and collective.
The individual responsibility of a Minister for the performance of his
official duties is both legal and conventional: it is owed legally to
the Sovereign, and also by convention to Parliament. "Responsible"
here does not mean morally responsible or culpable, but accountable
Id. at 272. Also consider the Parliamentary surveillance of post-World War
II nationalized industries: "The ... chief opportunity for members to acquire
information about the nationalized industries is by putting questions to Minis-
ters in the House." Id. at 481.
26. Id. at 87.
27. Id. at 114.
28. Id. at 14-15, 28-30.
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continual parliamentary review and approval; an American President
and his administration, for the most part, translates congressional
enactments into their own terms.
The Proposed Reuss Amendment
To adapt any part of the British constitutional process to the Ameri-
can problem of executive accountability would require a cataclysmic
shift in both philosophy and law. Ministerial control through mem-
bership in the legislative branch is not possible; American constitu-
tional prohibitions against dual officeholding are explicit,80 and be-
yond the practical possibility of alteration by a single amendment. In
other words, the use of legislative review of the proprieties of execu-
tive policy and action requires a recognized departure from the Ameri-
can version of separation of powers. The lessons of Watergate may
logically point to this, but such a remedial step must be seen for what
it actually would be.
The proposed no confidence amendment of Representative Reuss3I
is the most conspicuous current effort to implement executive ac-
countability by a modified version of the British constitutional proc-
ess. A threshold observation is that it would require the type of de-
parture from American constitutional theory and practice just men-
tioned.
Sections 1 and 2 of the amendment provide for a resolution of no
confidence which, if adopted by the requisite majority, would require
a plebiscitary type of special election in which both the offices of
President and Vice President, and all seats in Congress, would be
filled. Aside from the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of such a special
election for purposes of an ultimate enforcement of accountability, it
may be observed in passing that it would put the incoming executive
and legislative branches in much the position of the first Congress.
In terms of disruption of seniority (an advantage in the view of some),
committee organization and business, and other considerations, the
cure might prove worse than the disease. 2
Section 1 suggests the British accountability principle without the
requirement of executive membership in the legislative branch. This
formal avoidance of the dual officeholding prohibition, however, does
not diminish the basic fact that separation of powers as an American
29. On matters in which judicial review may be had concerning executive/
administrative acts beyond the scope of Parliament's statutory grant of author-
ity (ultra vires), see id. at 514-19.
30. This prohibition is embodied in article I, section 6 of the United StatesConstitution. Most state constitutions have a separate article on distribution
of rowers and a specific prohibition of the holding of an office in one depart-
ment while an officeholder in another. See also NAIONAL MUN. LZAGUE,
MODEL STATE CONSTION (6th rev. ed. 1971).
31. H.J. Res. 1111, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
32. The British system permits such a monolithic party process largely be-
cause of the virtually autonomous functioning of continuing government activ-
ity under the civil service. 0. PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINsTRATIE
LAw 16 (5th ed. 1973).
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constitutional principle has been drastically qualified, if not abro-
gated, by the concept of congressional review and ratification of
executive action. There is, arguably, a safeguard in the requirement
of a three-fifths majority vote for adoption of a no confidence resolu-
tion, as distinguished from the simple majority in Parliament; but this
raises the even more fundamental problem of the difference from the
parliamentary system of a government based upon a party organiza-
tion of the House of Commons.
The no confidence principle in the British practice is an integral
part of the policy of party control of the legislature. It is based on
the premise that the Government is the creation of the party in con-
trol, and hence the responsibility of that party. Defeat of the Govern-
ment requires the breaking of the controlling majority's solidarity.33
Implementing the no confidence principle may result in either the for-
mation of a new Government acceptable to the existing majority, or
the dissolution of Parliament in order to seek a more definitive major-
ity. Section 2 of the Reuss proposal assumes that the whole question
of Congress' action on a no confidence resolution should be submitted
to the electorate, but the procedure lacks the logic of the policy of
parliamentary dissolution, which is a means of seeking a firmer legis-
lative foundation upon which an executive program may be erected. 4
In theory, at least, the proposed amendment is one way of effectu-
ating executive accountability. Section 1 would establish a means of
initiating a process of terminating a presidential incumbency through
a vote of three-fifths, which is more than the simple majority of par-
liamentary procedure and less than the two-thirds of the American
impeachment procedure. Section 2 would submit the whole question
of congressional action and presidential continuity to the electorate.
This procedure might be warranted, not on any analogy to British
constitutional practice, but on the simple pragmatic proposition that
if a President were returned to office by such a plebiscite, the majority
which sought to remove him should not be. One may conjecture on
an endless variety of combinations of political circumstances which
would breed in such a culture bed; and it is submitted that the whole
process is cumbersome and potentially mischievous, particularly
when there would appear to be alternatives already at hand.
33. Professor Phillips points out that a '"majority" government has not beendefeated in Commons on a matter of substance in this century; defeat on a
matter of policy or motion of confidence would lead promptly to dissolution,
unless a "minority" or coalition government undertakes to form a new govern-
ment. Id. at 26.34. The dissolution of Parliament may be at the initiative of the Govern-
ment itself in an effort to convert itself from a 'minority" to a '"majority"government, as in the British elections of October, 1974.
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Uses of the Twenty-fifth Amendment
Galvanized by the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963, along
with the succession of Lyndon B. Johnson and his known history of
heart trouble, the problem of presidential succession is addressed by
the Congress in the twenty-fifth amendment. Section 1 of this
amendment, as finally adopted, reiterates and clarifies the succession
of a Vice President to the Presidency. 35 More importantly, section
2 provides for the filling of the office of Vice President when succes-
sion to the Presidency occurs, thus taking from Congress the primary
responsibility for providing more than contingency steps in succes-
sion.36 Sections 1 and 2, in other words, are intended to dispose of
the matter of succession, and sections 3 and 4 are focused upon the
matter of disability.3 7
Although article II of the Constitution had originally provided for
both of these matters to some degree, 38 the twenty-fifth amendment
was generally endorsed as a desirable restatement of the subject in
more appropriate contemporary context.39 The uniform tenor of pro-
fessional discussion, congressional hearings and debate, and probably
general public understanding, was that this amendment sought to deal
with instances of physical or mental inability of the President to dis-
charge the duties of his office. It is safe to say, further, that few per-
sons seriously anticipated the circumstances under which sections 1
and 2 of the amendment would actually be applied in the twelve-
month sequence of Spiro Agnew's resignation, Gerald Ford's nomina-
tion to fill Agnew's office, Nixon's resignation and Ford's succession,
followed by Nelson Rockefeller's nomination to succeed Ford as Vice
President.
It is suggested that the remarkable events of 1973-74 have broadened
the reach of the twenty-fifth amendment with respect to sections 1
and 2, and thus invite a broadening of the reach of section 3 and par-
35. John Tyler, upon succeeding William Henry Harrison in 1841, raised a
question of whether he had legally become President in his own right or had
simply become an Acting President. J. FEERICK, FRoM FAILING HANDS: THE
STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 92 (1965): Longaker, Presidential Continu-
ity: The Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 532, 535 (1966).
36. Somewhat ironically, as historical pers-ective now suggests, SenatorSam Ervin stated in debate on provisions of section 2 of the amendment, when
it was being considered by Congress, that the filling of a Vice Presidency
should be by constitutional rrovision, lest "power-hungry men in Congress ...
take charge of the Presidency." 111 CONG. REc. 3269 (1965). See also 3 U.S.C.
§ 19 (1970).
37. Cf. S. REP. No. 66, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H. REP. No. 564, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
38. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
39. See generally J. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESI-
DENTIAL SUCCESSION (1965). The author was a member of the American Bar
Association's Committee on Presidential Disability and Succession. See also
Longaker, Presidential Continuity: The Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 13 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 532 (1966) (excellent summary of historical developments and con-gressional considerations on the subject); Feerick, Proposed Amendment on
Presidenlial Inability and Vice-Presidential Vacancy. 51 A.B.A.J. 915 (1965);
Feerick, The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, 34 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 173 (1965).
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ticularly section 4.40
In the final weeks of the Nixon administration, it was speculated
on several occasions that the President could or should indeed avail
himself of this provision, permitting Ford to become Acting President
pending the outcome of the impeachment action.41 Such speculation
assumed, at the outset, that the concept of disability was not in fact
limited to physical or mental condition, an assumption which mani-
festly is bolstered by the general language of the constitutional clause
as well as the established meaning of the concept in law. Disability,
according to English common law usage, is the absence of legal ability
to do certain acts or enjoy certain rights; it may be either general
or special, personal or absolute.42 American courts have generally ac-
cepted the English definition, while adding a specific recognition that
disability may be either physical or civil.4 8
Congress has not thus far undertaken to enact implementing legisla-
tion for section 4, clause 1 of the twenty-fifth amendment, other than
certain routine amplifications of 3 U.S.C. § 19 already noted.44 With
the object lesson of Watergate now indelibly inscribed in modern con-
stitutional history, the same considerations which have generated the
proposed Reuss amendment may well, if not better, be directed to a
further amending of the United States Code section to accomplish the
basic objective: fashioning a practical means for calling the executive
to account in extraordinary circumstances which may now, in the light
of experience, be regarded as potentially recurrent.
An implementing statute, for example, 3 U.S.C. § 19, could well ac-
complish the objective of accountability by establishing a disability
and discipline commission quite analogous to the judicial commissions
of this type now operating in various states. 45 Such a statute might
include a section on the composition and powers of "such . . . body
as Congress may by law provide,""46 a definition of inability as physi-
cal or legal disability,47 general or specific steps of procedure to be
40. The relevant portion of section 4 is the opening provision:
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal
officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Con-
gress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their writ-
ten declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume
the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4, cL 1 (emphasis added).
41. Cf. Comments of former Justice Abe Fortas on presidential powers and
pro,-rieties. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1974, § 4. at 17, col. 3.
42. W. JowITr, DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW 633-34 (1959).
43. BLACK'S LAW DIcIONARY 548 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
44. See note 36 supra.
45. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 68701-05, 68725-26, 68750-55 (1968); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-37.1 to 2.1-37.18 (1950).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4, cl. 2.
47. Cf. notes 42 & 43 supra.
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followed by this body when called upon to perform, and provisions
for implementing clause 2 of section 4 of the twenty-fifth amendment,
which concerns the procedures for granting or denying the President's
declaration that the disability no longer exists.48
The Appendix to this article contains a rudimentary draft of a stat-
ute which, as amended and refined, would provide the machinery for
an inquiry which would apply sections 3 and 4 of the twenty-fifth
amendment to the accountability principle. It may be objected that
such a statute, rather than drawing upon British constitutional experi-
ence, looks back to the functions of the tribunes of the Roman repub-
lic. If so, perhaps this is an asset rather than a defect; the quest to-
day, indeed, is for Gracchi. Or, to continue the Latinisms, the quest
is for those who at last can respond to the law's age-old question, quis
custodiet custodes?
48. This clause provides:
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro ten-pore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Reuresentatives
his written declaration that no inability exists he shall resume thepowers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a major-
ity of either the principal officers of the executive denartment or of
such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within fourdays to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives their written declaration that the Presi-
dent is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. There-
upon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight
hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-
one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress
is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required
to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that thePresident is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as ActingPresident; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and du-
ties of his office.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXV, § 4, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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APPENDIX
Draft Statute for a Commission on Presidential
Disability
Section 1. Whenever a three-fourths majority of both Houses of
Congress shall by recorded vote determine, the President or President
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Represent-
atives shall convene a fact-finding body to be known as the Commis-
sion on Presidential Disability. The commission shall be composed as
follows:
The Vice President of the United States, the Chief Justice of the
United States, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate
and House of Representatives shall meet at the call of the Vice Presi-
dent and elect four additional public members, one each to be chosen
from lists of three nominations presented by the respective majority
and minority leaders. The ten members of the commission thus
chosen shall then elect, by majority vote, three other public members
as nominated by members of the commission already designated or
elected. These thirteen persons shall constitute the commission, at all
meetings of which the Vice President shall preside, and in his absence
the Chief Justice shall preside.
The commission, pursuant to the provisions of this act, shall meet
within - days to elect the four public members as hereinbefore pro-
vided, and within - days thereafter to elect the remaining public
members as hereinbefore provided. Within - days thereafter it shall
prepare its rules of procedure as may be deemed necessary to im-
plement the provisions of section 3 of this act, and within - days
thereafter begin its inquiry into the question of Presidential disability.
The Congress shall provide the necessary funds for the use of the
commission in the discharge of its functions, 'including the employ-
ment of clerical and professional staff, travel expenses of witnesses
appearing before the commission, and publication and distribution of
its hearings and reports.
Section 2. For purposes of this act, the term "disability" shall be
defined as either (a) the physical, mental or emotional incapacity of
the President to discharge the powers and duties of his office or (b)
the legal incapacity of the President to discharge the same by virtue
of allegations of malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance in respect
of the powers and duties of his office as provided by the Constitution
of the United States and the laws of the United States enacted in
pursuance thereof.
Section 3. In the case of alleged physical, mental or emotional in-
capacity of the President, the commission shall forthwith engage a
1975]
panel of competent and expert professional persons, selected with the
advice of the Surgeon General of the United States and representa-
tives of the governing boards of the National Institutes of Health, to
examine the President and to submit a comprehensive report of their
findings to the commission, for transmission to both Houses of the
Congress together with the recommendations of the commission.
Section 4. In the case of alleged legal incapacity as defined in part
(b) of section 2 of this act, the commission shall undertake its inquiry
in accordance with its rules of procedure as provided in section 1 of
this act, and for the purposes of its inquiry it shall have the following
powers:
(a) In the conduct of its inquiry and its formal proceedings, the
commission may (i) administer oaths; (ii) order and otherwise provide
for the inspection of books and records; and (iii) issue subpoenas for
the attendance of witnesses and the production of papers, books, ac-
counts and documents in any form, and testimony relevant to its in-
quiry. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
shall have jurisdiction to compel enforcement of the subpoenas of the
commission as may be necessary.
(b) In the conduct of its inquiry the commission may order the
deposition of a person residing within or without the United States
to be taken in such form and subject to such limitations as may be
prescribed in the order. A subpoena for such deposition shall be is-
sued by the commission and shall be enforceable in the United States
District Court in the district where it shall be served.
(c) In the event that there be drawn into question the relevance
of certain records, papers or documents of any form, by reason of their
confidentiality or sensitivity in matters of public welfare and interest,
the particular records, papers or documents shall be examined by the
Chief Justice of the United States and his decision as to relevance
shall be final.
The commission shall undertake its inquiry into Presidential dis-
ability with all deliberate expedition consonant with comprehensive
and objective determination of the facts in the case.
Section 5. Upon the completion of its inquiry the commission shall
prepare a report on its findings and recommendations, and shall sub-
mit this report to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives. The report shall be a dec-
laration that the President is either able or unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, and shall include supporting state-
ments or documents produced in the course of the procedure set out
in either sections 3 or 4 of this act.
If the declaration of the commission be that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President
shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting
President.
Section 6. In the event of a finding of disability in terms of section
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3 of the act, the Congress shall then proceed forthwith to consider
the further responsibility of the commission in reporting on the peri-
odic evaluation of the condition of the President by competent and
expert professional persons as provided in section 3. In the event
that the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that no inability exists, the commission shall meet and
within four days of receipt of the President's declaration by the Presi-
dent pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Rep-
resentatives shall submit its written declaration that the President is
either able or unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
If the declaration be that the disability of the President continues,
Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of this declaration, or,
if not in session, within twenty-one days after it is required to as-
semble, shall determine by two-thirds vote of both Houses whether
the President is able or unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, and if the vote determines the continued inability of the
President to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice
President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President
and the commission shall continue to report on the periodic evalua-
tion of the condition of the President as aforesaid.
Section 7. In the event of a finding of disability in terms of section
4 of this act, the Congress shall then proceed to consider the appropri-
ate action to be taken. In the deliberations of any committee of either
House of Congress on this question, all papers, records and documents
of any form received by the commission shall be admissible into the
record of the said committee, and the presiding officer of the commis-
sion shall be subject to call of the committee to testify on the commis-
sion's report.
If it be the sense of the Congress that the legal disability of the
President warrants impeachment, the Committee on the Judiciary of
the House of Representatives shall proceed to draft articles of im-
peachment and, if adopted by a majority of the full House, shall be
presented to the Senate for a trial on the same. In the event of a
two-thirds vote of the Senate for any such article, the President shall
be removed from office and the Vice President shall become Presi-
dent.
If it be the sense of the Congress that the legal disability of the
President consists of censurable conduct, each House shall proceed to
vote on the question of censure. In the event of a failure of the Sen-
ate to vote by a two-thirds majority for any article of impeachment,
or upon the recordation of the vote of each House of Congress on the
question of censure (whether affirmative or negative), the legal dis-
ability of the President shall be declared terminated and he shall at
once resume the powers and duties of his office.
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